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Anita Indira Anand* Visible Minorities in The Multi-
Racial State: When Are
Preferential Policies Justifiable?
This article outlines the circumstances in which the state is justified in implement-
ing preferential policies in favour of visible minorities and describes an approach
to policy formulation. The thesis is that visible minorities warrant preferential
treatment in order to rectify past injustices and to redistribute advantages to
visible minorities who are chronically poor. "Supply-side" over "demand-side"
policies are favoured. Supply-side policies are preferable because they support
substantive equality by ensuring that individuals have a minimum level of
subsistence. If the goal of achieving substantive equality is to be achieved, the
poor should also be entitled to benefit under preferential policies. Thus, preferen-
tial policies should targetpoorpeople generally and visible minorities specifically.
Cet article d6limite les circonstances dans lesquelles I'6tat estjustifid d'appliquer
des politiques preferentielles en faveur de minorit6s visibles et expose les
grandes lignes d'une approche de formuler des politiques dans de tels cas. Le
principal argument de cet article est que le traitement preferentiel des minorites
visibles est justifi6 afin de rectifier des injustices passees et de redistribuer des
avantages aux minorit6s visibles qui souffrent d'une pauvret6 chronique. Cet
article appuie des politiques -supply-side, au lieu du "demande-side"; celles-la
sont pr6f6rables car elles s'inclinent vers I'ideal de l'ind6pendance en assurant
que les individus ont un niveau minimum de subsistance. Cependant, si le but de
r6aliser une 6galite mat6rielle est d'6tre pris au s6rieux, les pauvres devraient
avoir droit aux avantages sous ces politiques pr6ferentielles. Ainsi, les politiques
pr~f6rentielles devraients'adresserg~neralementauxpauvres etsp~cifiquement
aux minoritds visibles.
Introduction
The purpose of this article is twofold: to describe the circumstances in
which the state can justifiably implement preferential policies in favour
of visible minorities and to outline an approach to policy formulation.
These issues are of particular importance in light of current controversies
in Canada and the United States over whether preferential policies are
both fair and effective in addressing racial disadvantage. Critics of
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to thank Michael Trebilcock for enthusiastically supporting the writing of this piece. I am
indebted to my friend and mentor Stephen Beke who spent endless hours discussing the article
with me. I am also indebted to John Knowlton for his unwavering patience, kindness and
devotion. I dedicate this work to my parents and to the latest addition to our family, Anand
Robert, whose impending arrival motivated me to complete it.
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preferential policies claim that the policies constitute "reverse discrimi-
nation," violate the individual's right to equal treatment under the law and
ignore the importance of individual merit. They also contend that present
generations should not have to pay for the sins of their forebears. Do these
views undermine the justifiability of preferential policies? How should
one balance competing claims between visible minorities and minorities
not identified by colour? These broad questions are the focus of the
following article. Throughout this work, "preferential policies" will be
defined broadly as policies which legally mandate that individuals be
judged by differing criteria depending on the particular visible minority
group from which they originate.' The term "visible minorities" refers to
persons who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.2 These
persons either identify themselves or are identified by others as being
members of various racial groups, including aboriginals, blacks, Chi-
nese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, Indo-Pakistani, West Indian and Arab,
Southeast Asian, Latin Americans, Indonesian, and Pacific Islanders.3
This discussion focuses on preferential policies; it does not address
legislation that prohibits discrimination.4 Anti-discrimination legislation
attacks discrimination that is intentional ("disparate treatment" or "direct
discrimination") and actions or policies that have the effect of discrimi-
nating ("disparate impact" or "indirect discrimination"). Such legislation
is justifiable because it ensures that citizens receive equal treatment in
1. See T. Sowell, Preferential Policies: An International Perspective (New York: William
Morrow, 1990) at 13-14.
2. This definition derives from the work completed by Statistics Canada on the issue of census
data and the identification of visible minorities in Canada. See Statistics Canada, Making the
Tough Choices in Using Census Data to Count Visible Minorities In Canada (Ottawa:
Employment Equity Data Program, 1990) and Approaches to the Collection ofData on Visible
Minorities in Canada: A Review and Commentary (Ottawa: Employment Equity Data
Program, 1991). Although Statistics Canada does not classify aboriginal peoples as "visible
minorities," they will be considered to be members of this group in this article. I recognize that
aboriginals tend to object to being classified as visible minorities on the basis that such
classifications overlook aboriginal peoples' distinct political agenda which centres on the
rights to self-determination and self-government. They argue that this agenda differs from
claims made by visible minorities which are primarily directed at ensuring the effective
exercise of common rights of citizenship. By classifying aboriginal peoples as visible
minorities in this article, I do not deny that they should be granted rights to self-determination
and self-government and none of the policy initiatives proposed herein preclude the possibility
of their being granted such rights.
3. This list is not exhaustive. Indeed, as the recent debate over whether to include a question
with respect to race on Statistics Canada's 1996 Census Form suggests, categorizing visible
minorities into particular groups is a difficult task.
4. See, e.g., Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 19 and the Canadian Human Rights Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 [hereinafter such legislation will be referred to as "anti-discrimination
legislation"].
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employment, residential arrangements and membership in voluntary
groups. The fundamental question of this article is whether the law should
go beyond the obligations typically contained in anti-discrimination
legislation and require employers and educational institutions to give
preferential treatment to visible minorities. Related questions include:
what are the normative justifications for preferential policies? On what
basis do visible minorities as opposed to other groups in society warrant
preferential treatment? Who should bear the burden of rendering com-
pensation to visible minorities?
Each of the first three sections below examines a normative justifica-
tion for preferential policies. Section I discusses the "rectification prin-
ciple," under which preferential treatment is warranted in order to correct
for past wrongs. Section II focuses on the "utility maximization prin-
ciple," which asserts that benefits should be granted to visible minorities
to the extent that those benefits increase the welfare of society as a whole
or the specific visible minority group in particular. Section III analyzes
the "distributive justice principle," which holds that groups ought to
receive preferential treatment in order to ensure an equitable redistribu-
tion of benefits, advantages or opportunities. Section IV addresses the
criticisms of preferential policies and suggests the form that they should
take. Do the policies place an undue burden on young white males to
compensate visible minorities? Does merit matter? Do preferential
policies constitute "reverse discrimination"? Section IV points to a
means of resolving those issues by using "supply-side" over "demand-
side" policies.
"Supply-side" policies commit substantial public resources to improv-
ing the quality of education (especially early education), housing, health
care, transportation networks and policing in visible minority communi-
ties.5 The costs are largely underwritten by taxing higher income mem-
bers of society. Supply-side policies address problems associated with
racial disadvantage early in people's lives with benefits usually mani-
fested in the long-run.6
"Demand-side" policies, in contrast, impose obligations on public and
private employers and educational institutions. The effects are visible in
the short-run. "Positive" obligations are imposed with affirmative action
or employment equity plans which use race as a criterion for hiring and
admissions.
5. M. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1993) at 207.
6. Ibid. at 208.
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The central argument in section IV is that supply-side policies are not
only fairer but also more useful in addressing the issue of racial disadvan-
tage. Demand-side policies may result in young white males bearing a
disproportionate burden of rendering compensation to visible minorities.
The young white male may have to forgo employment positions or
educational opportunities that he otherwise would have earned on merit
so that a member of a visible minority can fill the place. Section IV argues
that this burden is too onerous; we all have only one life to live and, in
pursuing a goal, we expect to be judged based on our abilities. Affirma-
tive action undermines these expectations.
Supply-side policies are appealing because they support the ideal of
"substantive equality" which ensures that individuals have a minimum
level of subsistence. The minimum level is a prerequisite for advance-
ment in employment and education. Preferential policies that support
substantive equality will likely also be more politically palatable to a
majority of the population, some of whom may otherwise be forced to
sacrifice opportunities under demand-side policies.
What are the implications of substantive equality for a racially-
specific policy? The paper argues that there are reasons for providing
preferential treatment to visible minorities as opposed to other groups,
including the necessity of rectifying past injustices and the need to
redistribute advantages to visible minorities who are chronically poor.
However, as the distributive justice principle asserts, it is unjust to
compensate impoverished visible minorities without compensating im-
poverished people generally. If the goal of substantive equality is to be
reached, the poor should be entitled to benefit under preferential policies.
Therefore, the policy approach favoured in section IV is one in which
preferential policies target poor people generally and visible minorities
specifically.
Preferential policies can be both fair and useful if they are sensitive to
the realities of the communities, businesses and institutions in which they
are implemented. Too often, discussions about these policies amount to
little more than an exchange of slogans-such as "equality"! or "reverse
discrimination"!-that ignore the complexity of real life situations and
fail to balance commitments to competing values (forexample, meritocracy
versus compensation for past wrongs). As a result, debates tend to be
extremely divisive, pitting advantaged and disadvantaged groups against
each other. An aim of this article, therefore, is to inform those discussions
and to suggest policies that will be acceptable to parties on all sides.
Unless we are able to reach compromises in developing preferential
policies, racial harmony and social justice will remain elusive goals.
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I. The Rectification Principle
Some scholars consider preferential policies justified because the poli-
cies are necessary to correct for past injustices to visible minorities. The
rectification principle looks to the past to determine whether a person or
group suffered an injustice that demands compensation. However, the
features of the rectification principle are controversial. What constitutes
a past injustice? Who is entitled to benefit? What type of compensation
is appropriate? Section I argues that the rectification principle as com-
monly formulated is unable to answer adequately these questions. It
favours aredefinition of the principle so that preferential policies favouring
a specific visible minority group (and descendants of the group) may be
justified only if a law, policy or systemic practice has previously victim-
ized the group.
1. Two Models of the Rectification Principle
Some theorists argue that compensation for past wrongs must be awarded
on the principle that the individual who suffered a particular injustice
should be restored to the position he or she occupied prior to the
occurrence of the injustice.7 This principle has been enunciated in the
context of two theoretical models: the "just holdings model" and the "tort-
based compensation model."
a. The Just Holdings Model
Nozick has enunciated a rectification principle in the context of his
"entitlement theory." His central claim is that individuals have a right to
dispose of their goods and services freely as long as they have justly
acquired these "holdings."8 Inherited wealth, athletic prowess or high
intelligence may enable some individuals to accumulate more wealth
than others. As long as the accumulation of wealth was legitimate, then
no injustice has been done. However, if the initial acquisition involved
the use of force, the acquisition was illegitimate and so is the current title.
If the acquisition of wealth was illegitimate, Nozick asserts that a
"principle of rectification of injustice" is triggered.9 This principle
provides that a past injustice will be rectified by elevating its victims to
7. See, e.g., R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) and A.
Goldman, Justice and Reverse Discrimination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977),
discussed infra section 1.
8. Nozick, ibid. at 151.
9. Ibid. at 152-53, 230-3 1.
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a level of well-being which is at least as high as the victims would have
occupied had the injustice never occurred. 10 As Nozick states, the
rectification principle
presumably will make use of its best estimate of subjunctive information
about what would have occurred... if the injustice had not taken place. If
the actual description of holdings turns out not to be one of the descriptions
yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded must be
realized."
Nozick does not completely describe the circumstances in which the
principle will apply. According to him, the particular history of the
society in question will determine which "operable rule of thumb" best
approximates a detailed application of the principle."
The just holdings model provides a justification for preferential
policies in limited circumstances. Proponents of the model envision a
minimal state in which individuals should be left alone to acquire and
exchange goods-or "holdings" - as they see fit. Slavery, however, as
well as the vast array of discriminatory policies that affected blacks after
slavery was formally abolished, is viewed as an unjust form of confisca-
tion. Hence, the rectification principle would govern. Application of the
rectification principle to aboriginal peoples would likely require the state
to return lands to them. Their lands were often acquired using force and
would therefore constitute illegitimate holdings. In order to place aborigi-
nal peoples in the position they would otherwise have occupied, either the
lands must be returned or an alternative form of compensation must be
provided. 3
b. The Tort-based Compensation Model
Other formulations of the rectification principle focus on the type of
compensation that individuals should receive. According to Goldman,
"reverse discrimination" is justified where an individual's rights have
been violated. Goldman defines "reverse discrimination" as "preferential
treatment for minority-group members or women in job hiring, school
admissions, or training-program policies." 4 Rather than addressing the
10. Ibid. at 231. See also G.S. Kavka,"An Internal Critique of Nozick's Entitlement Theory"
in A. Corlett, ed., Equality and Liberty (Hong Kong: Macmillan Academic and Professional,
1991) 307.
11. Nozick, supra note 7 at 152-53.
12. Nozick, ibid. at 231.
13. See D. Lyons, "The New Indian Claims and the Original Rights to Land" (1977) 4 Soc.
Theory & Practice 249 for an argument that aboriginal peoples today probably do not have a
right to their ancestors' land even if it had not been unjustly appropriated.
14. Nozick, supra note 7 at 4.
98 Dalhousie Law Journal
historical position of a particular group, reverse discrimination redresses
a specific injury committed against the individual. Where an individual's
rights have been infringed, the individual "should be restored by the
perpetrator of the injury to the position he would have occupied, had the
injury not occurred."15 Thus, the rectification principle applies only
where the harm is "direct, clear, and measurable," which, as Goldman
states, is "a corollary long used in the law of torts .... ." 16
Under the tort-based compensation model, the rectification principle
applies to groups only if three criteria are met: the group must have
established practices or purposes and its members must interact; it must
have suffered specific damages that cannot be assigned differentially
within the group; and, it must have an official body which can receive the
compensation on behalf of all its members. 7 According to Goldman,
under these restricted conditions, the only visible minority group that
qualifies is "the Indian tribes whose treaties were violated by the federal
government."' 8 Black Americans do not qualify because they do not meet
the third condition, although Goldman admits that "some kind of com-
pensation seems owed to the entire group.""
2. Problems With Counterfactual Reasoning
In many cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, to apply the rectification
principle to resolve issues of racial injustice. One difficulty with the
principle is that its application involves counterfactual reasoning, or
reasoning about what would have been the state of affairs in the absence
of the original injustice.
a. Temporal Considerations
The rectification principle holds that individuals should be placed in the
position they would have occupied, had the injustice not occurred.
Therefore, if we wish to compensate American blacks we would have to
ask what their positions would have been if slavery and the Jim Crow laws
in the American South had not existed. But responses to this question are
indeterminate. A key issue is how far back in time it is necessary to travel
in order to ensure that the original injustice has been rectified. The
question is not whether we would literally return blacks to the African
15. Ibid. at 69.
16. Ibid. at 67.
17. Ibid. at 85.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
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countries in which they resided before they became slaves, but which
standard of living we would use as the basis on which to rectify the
injustice. Do we use the standard of living of blacks in Africa prior to their
coming to America? With respect to past injustices that aboriginal
peoples have suffered, would we refer to their standard of living prior to
being dispossessed of their lands? The difficulty is that we cannot
ascertain what the standard of living originally was for these groups and
we cannot, therefore, place them in the position they would have occupied
had the injustice not occurred. In addition, given the changes in living
standards since the original injustice, it is conceivable that we may make
some groups politically and economically worse off by returning them to
their position prior to the injustice.
In order to fulfill the goals of the rectification principle, perhaps we
should speculate how blacks would have fared in America if they had not
been forced to endure slavery and discrimination under Jim Crow laws.
Such speculation suggests that a more sophisticated version of the
rectification principle is necessary. The principle would seek to restore
the aggrieved parties to the standard of living they would have occupied
today, had the original injustice not occurred. However, hypothesizing
about what the group's current position would have been in the absence
of the original injustice is also problematic. First, blacks were brought to
America as slaves; many would not have come but for institutionalized
slavery. Thus, determining what their position would be today if the
injustice had not occurred may mean that they would not even be in
America. Second, an issue of "infinite regress" arises; an improper act
committed by group A against group B in the relatively recent past may
have been preceded by an act of injustice by group B against group C in
the more distant past.20 It is difficult to assess the position the aggrieved
group would have occupied today in light of the various wrongful acts
that have occurred throughout history.
b. Scope of Injury
Another difficulty with the rectification principle involves determining
the scope of the harm. It is often unclear whether the present plight of the
affected group stems from the original cause alone or whether the
occurrence of additional events also contributed to the injustice. An
example is the severely disadvantaged position of aboriginal peoples. Is
it entirely due to the fact that they were unfairly dispossessed of their
20. Trebilock, supra note 5 at 193.
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lands? Or does it also result from subsequent occurrences such as the fact
that many aboriginal peoples were unwilling to integrate into a society led
by white Europeans? In the case of American blacks, is slavery alone
responsible for their disadvantage or must we attribute their difficulties
partly to economic transformations such as the deindustrialization of
American cities and the loss of jobs for many blacks employed in
manufacturing industries?2' There may be multiple causes of a group's
current plight and one may be unable to determine precisely to what
extent a group's current circumstances derive from a particular event.
c. Who Benefits? The Resort to Tortious Principles of Compensation
Another problem in applying the rectification principle lies in specifying
the class of beneficiaries under preferential policies. While it is generally
impossible to compensate the original victims of past injustices, it is
possible to compensate their descendants. The categorization of descen-
dants, however, is difficult. For example, in determining who is an
aboriginal, do we count on-reserve, off-reserve, status and non-status
Indians? Mdtis and Inuit? Must we trace the lineage of these individuals?
If so, how? Do we include all blacks, regardless of their personal histories,
or only the blacks whose histories can be traced to the West Coast of
Africa where a majority of slaves originated?2 2 Do we include more
recent immigrants from the Caribbean, Africa or England? The issue is
not simply who is a descendant but also whether individuals other than
direct descendants should benefit.
In addition, as time passes, it becomes more likely that if the wrongful
act had not occurred, individuals who claim to be beneficiaries under the
rectification principle would never have been born. 23 As Davis explains,
the principle of rectification will probably not help us if we attempt a full-
scale rectification of the injustices in our society's past, for if we were to
project 200 years of our country's history in a rectified movie, the cast of
characters would surely differ significantly from the existing cast. Had our
ancestors lived and moved in a rectified version of our history, quite likely
many of us would not be alive today. 24
21. Such an explanation is put forth by W.J. Wilson in The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1987) at 12.
22. See B. Quarles, The Negro in the Making of America, 3d ed. (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1996) at 22.
23. G. Sher, "Ancient Wrongs and Modem Rights" (1981) 10 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 7.
24. L. Davis, "Nozick's Entitlement Theory" in J. Paul, ed., Reading Nozick: Essays On
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New Jersey: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981) at 351.
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This reasoning may, however, regress too far; we all might not exist but
for the occurrence of all sorts of events. We may still decry an injustice
despite the fact that, but for the occurrence of the injustice, we may not
be alive today.
Goldman attempts to avoid difficulties in identifying beneficiaries and
defining the scope of the harm by awarding compensation according to
tortious principles of compensation. One must, however, question the
utility of drawing an analogy to the law of torts in cases of racial
discrimination. Consider that it was once a crime in the United States to
provide education to slaves .25 Even after the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, blacks were denied equal educational opportunities and
relegated to inferior educational institutions.26 The effects of the original
policy of denying blacks an education were far-reaching and undoubtedly
affected many succeeding generations. A tort-based approach would
seek to assess the extent of the harm and to restore the victims to the
position they occupied prior to the occurrence of the harm. However,
since the original injustice had "domino" effects throughout the black
community, it would be difficult to meet these requirements.
3. A Reformulated Rectification Principle
Despite the difficulties in applying the principle of rectification, we need
not discard it altogether as a justification for compensating visible
minorities. In the case of certain visible minority groups, it seems safe to
assume that their current impoverishment is due in some measure,
however indeterminate, to the original injustice.
a. Group-based Approach
An alternative conception of the rectification principle addresses wrongs
committed against groups. Thus if a law, policy or social practice
victimized a particular group because of a characteristic that every
member of the group possessed (i.e., a certain colour of skin), it is
justifiable to grant compensation to members of that group. Under this
conception of the rectification principle, the issue is whether an indi-
25. See Regents of University of California v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978) at 371 [hereinafter
Bakke], Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun JJ citing R. Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The
South 1820-1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964) at 90-91.
26. Ibid. The Fourteenth Amendment prescribes that "no state shall .. .deny to a person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws .... .
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vidual possesses the characteristic that prompted victimization in the first
place .27
The question may arise: why should every member of the group
receive compensation instead of just those individuals who suffered the
injustice? One reason is that the injustice was committed against the
group and, therefore, some form of compensation must be made to the
group. For example, in Plessy v. Fergusson, the high-water mark of the
Jim Crow era, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana law calling for
separate railroad accommodations for white and "colored" passengers."
Similar decisions were rendered in Canada as late as 1940. In Christie v.
York Corporation,2 9 a tavern operator refused to serve a black man
because of his colour. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the man's
claim for damages for humiliation, holding that, "[any merchant is free
to deal as he may choose with any members of the public. It is not a
question of motives or reasons for deciding to deal or not to deal; he is free
to do either."30
The lives of all blacks were affected by these judgments (and by every
other discriminatory law). Every black risked being denied service by a
merchant, restaurant or hotel owner, or railroad company. Because the
injustices were committed against blacks as a group, the remedy should
also be group specific.3' It is true that the liberty of every black was not
infringed; only those blacks who requested service at taverns or who
sought railroad accommodations were discriminated against. Nonethe-
less, each member of the group endured "psychological suffering."
Visible minorities who live and have lived in constant fear of being
victimized by the Ku Klux Klan or neo-Nazi groups experience harm.
While most blacks did not actually have their houses burned down and did
not fall victim to whipping and lynching by the Ku Klux Klan, all lived
in fear. The "harm" therefore extended to every member of the targeted
group whether or not every member actually experienced physical
violence.
27. See O.M. Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause" in T. Nagel, M. Cohen & T.
Scanlon, eds., Equality and Preferential Treatment (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1977) at 84. Fiss proposes a doctrine of constitutional interpretation called the "group-
disadvantaging principle" under which blacks as a group ought to be protected from hostile
state action.
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) [hereinafter Plessy].
29. [1940] 1 D.L.R. 81 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Christie].
30. Ibid. at 82.
31. One may question the type of redress that is owed today given the fact that the
discriminatory practices have been abandoned. This section discusses the normative justifica-
tion for providing compensation; section IV will discuss the type of compensation owed.
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b. Is the Rectification Principle Underinclusive?
If one accepts that visible minorities have suffered discrimination in the
work force and are entitled to preferential treatment under the rectifica-
tion principle, are other disadvantaged groups-such as women, people
with disabilities, homosexuals, Jews and other religious groups - able to
claim that they too have been victims of past discrimination?32 Women
could argue that they have historically been treated as the property of their
husbands and that, like visible minorities, they were excluded from public
institutions, denied the vote and subjected to discrimination in the labour
force.
Although gender discrimination existed and still exists, there is a
strong case to be made for denying women and other groups preferential
treatment if the effects of past discrimination are now less pervasive.
Statistics confirm that the effects of discrimination against women have
been alleviated to a considerable degree. 33 Women as a group may not
need preferential treatment. The key question is: what are the effects
today of this discrimination? If the past discrimination has been allevi-
ated, and the victims have made advances so that the effects of the original
injustice are not as severe, then preferential policies are unnecessary.
4. Summary
If the rectification principle is conceived in terms of the just holdings
model or the tort-based compensation model, serious difficulties arise.
These difficulties relate primarily to counterfactual reasoning: who
benefits under the preferential policy, the scope of the injury and what
constitutes a harm that warrants compensation. I argue that despite these
difficulties, the rectification principle still serves as a justification for
assigning benefits to visible minority groups. In particular, if the group
32. L.E. Trakman, "Substantive Equality in Constitutional Jurisprudence: Meaning within
Meaning" (1994) 7 Can. J.L. & Jur. 27 at 29. In the constitutional context, Trakman asserts that
"the definition of equality should encompass the interests of each group being compared, not
one above the other. Minorities and women should not be co-opted to an unidimensional
conception of equality at the expense of their distinctiveness." This argument differs from but
is consistent with arguments raised in this paper with respect to visible minorities.
33. Statistics Canada reports that in 1991,5.6 million women, representing 53 percent of all
women 15 and over, were employed. This was up from 41 percent in 1975. By contrast, male
employment fell from 74 percent to 67 percent over the same period. The increased level of
employment among women may be related to the fact that they are achieving higher levels of
education. For example, in 1991,40 percent of all women aged 15 and over had some post-
secondary training, up from 25 percent in 1981. Statistics Canada, "Highlights" in Women in
the Workplace, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 1993).
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was targeted by a discriminatory policy, law or practice then compensa-
tion under the rectification principle is warranted. In such a case, the
remedy ought to be awarded to the whole group and not to individual
victims. Compensation should be based on the fact that an injustice
occurred and on the fact that the effects of the injustice continue to affect
the visible minority group.
II. The Utility Maximization Principle
A second justification offered in support of preferential policies is that
they can maximize social utility. Unlike the rectification principle which
involves an assessment of historical events, the utility maximization
principle is forward looking. It underpins policies that seek, in the future,
to increase social welfare. This section addresses a number of issues
relating to the concept of utility maximization. How is utility measured?
What are the predictions underlying the principle? Does the principle
have a moral foundation? The argument in this section is that by itself, the
utility maximization principle cannot justify the implementation of
preferential policies. However, aspects of the principle, particularly its
focus on role models, diversity and need, are crucial in developing a
normative justification for preferential policies.
1. Two Models of Utility Maximization
Some theorists assert that the welfare of society, or of a particular visible
minority group, will be maximized if the benefits of implementing a
preferential policy outweigh the costs. This assertion is made in the
context of two theoretical paradigms: the "group welfare model" and the
"efficiency model."
a. Group Welfare Model
According to the group welfare model, preferential policies will encour-
age integration of minorities into mainstream American or Canadian life
more quickly than would otherwise be possible. Proponents of this model
argue that events such as the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, after the verdict
in the Rodney King case, occur because of blacks' frustration with their
exclusion from the mainstream. Preferential policies are useful because
they will ensure that visible minority groups become more evenly
distributed among different social and economic classes.34 This is desir-
34. See supra note 7 at 141-42 for a summary of this position.
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able first, because it will hasten the achievement of harmony between
racial groups and second, because members of minority groups will come
to occupy positions of power and prestige.
Under the group welfare model, cost-benefit analyses are central. The
key question is whether the benefits to the visible minority group
outweigh the costs to society as a whole. Benefits are often assessed in
terms of whether the preferential policy meets a specific need of the
group. For instance, do preferential policies in medical or law schools
address a need among disadvantaged visible minorities for persons who
will provide them with legal and medical services.35 Implicit in this
approach is the view that minorities service members of their own racial
groups more effectively.
Preferential policies may also increase group welfare by providing
role models for younger members of the group. Role models are individu-
als whom students can emulate; they, therefore, motivate students to do
their best work.36 The younger members of the minority group hopefully
will then move into similar positions more quickly. Over time a critical
mass of group members in key positions develops and the risk of
individual stereotyping decreases." The benefits derived from the pref-
erential policies thus "trickle down" from role models to other members
of the group.
In addition, proponents of the group welfare model argue that prefer-
ential policies encourage racial diversity in employment and education.
Racial diversity is desirable because it benefits not only the group in
question but also society as a whole since it promotes a "robust exchange
of ideas."38 This robust exchange of ideas encourages understanding and
is a first step towards racial harmony.
b. Efficiency Model
Some efficiency theorists assert that preferential policies move competi-
tive markets more quickly towards a non-discriminatory equilibrium. 9
Becker argues that employers who have a "taste" for discrimination will
35. T. Nagel, "Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination" in Nagel, Cohen &
Scanlon, supra note 28, 16.
36. For a full discussion of the role model argument in the university context, see A.L. Allen,
"The Role Model Argument and Faculty Diversity" in S.M. Cahn, ed., The Affirmative Action
Debate (New York: Routledge, 1995) 121.
37. See Action Travail des Femmes v. CJV.R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, 8 C.H.R.R. D/4210
[hereinafter Action Travail].
38. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
39. JJ. Donahue III, "Is Title VII Efficient?" (1986) 134 U. Pa. L. R. 1421.
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forgo certain advantageous transactions (such as hiring blacks whose
marginal revenue product exceeds that of at least some whites) in order
to realize their preferences not to employ blacks. 40 This aversion to
employing blacks imposes certain pecuniary costs on discriminatory
employers. White employees earn more than blacks who are equally or
more productive, since discriminatory employers do not face the same
non-pecuniary costs in employing them. The demand for visible minority
workers is reduced and fewer blacks are hired. Those blacks who do
secure employment earn a lower wage than they would in the absence of
discrimination. 41
Building on Becker's analysis, some efficiency scholars consider
preferential policies inefficient and argue that the social costs outweigh
the benefits.42 The market, not the state, should guide employers' hiring
decisions. Otherwise, non-pecuniary costs such as administration costs
borne by the state41 and litigation costs borne by employers would be
substantial.' These costs outweigh any gains to be had from lowering the
costs of transactions between members of different races (white and
blacks)!' Welfare will be maximized if competitive markets operate
without restraint. Some efficiency theorists further assert that preferential
policies are not only costly but also, in the long-run, unnecessary. If
discriminatory firms fail to maximize profits, they will, over time, be
driven from the market by firms that are not motivated by animus . Thus,
laws forbidding purely private discrimination are unnecessary.
40. G. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1971).
41. Discriminatory practices may not lead to a disequilibrium in terms of social-welfare; they
can be consistent with utility maximization. The non-pecuniary costs associated with bigoted
preferences prevents a higher equilibrium from being achieved in terms of social welfare but
allows a lower equilibrium to be sustained in the short-term. At this lower equilibrium (lower
than that achievable in the absence of discriminatory preferences), employees and employers
are maximizing individual utility for a given set of preferences.
42. R. A. Posner, "The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII" (1987-88) 136 U. Pa. L.R.
513 at 515. Posner interprets Becker's work as suggesting that anti-discrimination legislation
does not reduce the costs of discrimination. Posner states, "In Becker's analysis, the costs to
whites of associating with blacks are real costs, and a law requiring such associations does not,
at least in any obvious way, reduce those costs." Posner cites Becker, supra note 40 at 153-54.
However, although Becker does examine the non-pecuniary costs associated with tastes for
discrimination (and the shifts in market equilibria that result), he does not explicitly draw
conclusions with respect to the benefits or necessity of anti-discrimination law per se.
43. Posner points specifically to the fact that "in the year ending June 30, 1986, more than
9,000 suits charging employment discrimination, the vast majority under Title VII, were
brought in federal court. The aggregate costs of these cases, and the many more matters that
are settled without litigation, must be considerable." Posner, ibid. at 514.
44. Ibid. at 519.
45. Ibid. at 514.
46. Supra note 5 at 198.
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Despite these arguments, Donahue argues that the costs of preferential
policies do not outweigh the benefits, which include both symbolic gains
and actual gains. 7 Donahue agrees that in the long-term the market will
eliminate bigoted employers, yet he contends that this process will occur
more quickly with the assistance of preferential policies. Discriminatory
employers have imperfect abilities to collect and to react to all relevant
information. They may not, therefore, respond to incentives as predicted.
Preferential policies serve a useful purpose in that they actually hasten the
market's movement to the new, non-discriminatory equilibrium.48
2. Problems with Utility Calculations
a. What is "Utility" and How is it Measured?
Determining whether utility is maximized in a given instance can be
difficult, if not impossible. A first obstacle lies in determining what
precisely counts as "utility." Does "utility" refer to an individual's desire
not to be discriminated against? To increasing an individual's self-
respect regardless of one's own preferences? To the development of a
society that operates efficiently? The term "utility" seems to refer to a
number of factors, all of which in some way affect a person's well-being.
A further difficulty involves the question of how to measure utility. An
obvious response would be that we must assess whether the costs of
implementing a particular preferential policy outweigh the benefits. This
comparison, however, is difficult to make. A policy decision to abolish
affirmative action programs may generate gains in utility for employers
who maximize profits by hiring whomever they please. But the decision
generates losses for many employees, including visible minorities. How
can the net effect of this policy decision on various groups be measured?
As Trebilcock explains,
impacts on individuals' utility functions are not directly observable by
collective decision-makers and there is no ready way of ensuring accurate
revelation by individuals of their evaluations of these impacts, thus
rendering the utilities and disutilities associated with such a decision
largely unmeasurable and incommensurable.4
Trebilcock's point is, first, that observing utilities (and disutilities) is
difficult because the utility of a particular policy will differ depending on
the group in question. Second, even if utilities are discoverable, there is
no sure way to weigh them, one against the other.
47. Ibid. at 1604.
48. Supra note 39 at 1421-22.
49. Supra note 5 at 8.
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b. Role Models
Although it may not be possible to measure precisely the utilities and
disutilities of a preferential policy, it may nevertheless be possible in
some cases to assume that the benefit to the minority community will
outweigh the costs to the dominant community ° For example, the
benefits to the black community of role models, such as Thurgood
Marshall on the U.S. Supreme Court, outweigh the costs to the white
community of not having another white justice on the court.
This utility calculation may be unpersuasive to role models for
minority communities. Some individuals may be concerned that their
"job" as a role model forces them to paint a false picture of the likelihood
of success for younger members of their group. Richard Delgado, a black
law professor, imagines himself speaking to children in an inner-city
school. He explains, "I am expected to tell the kids that if they study hard
and stay out of trouble, they can be become a law professor like me. That,
however, is a very big lie: a whopper."'" Delgado asserts that if he were
honest, he would advise the children to become major league baseball or
basketball players since their chances of success are much better in those
lines of work.52 In terms of a utility calculation, Delgado may conclude
that the benefits to the black community of telling these "lies" do not
outweigh the costs to the white community of instituting these role
models.
It may be argued, however, that Delgado misconceives the role of role
models. Even if it is unlikely that the children will become law professors,
they may be inspired to work harder and to improve their grades once they
hear a law professor speak. The message that the role model sends is not
that children will necessarily become law professors but that their
chances for success in whatever career they choose will increase if they
work harder. Rather than viewing role models as "liars," we should
consider them as examples for others.
A more compelling argument against role modeling is that often those
who require preferential treatment are not the true beneficiaries." As
Professor Carter explains, the most disadvantaged black people are not in
a position to benefit from preferential treatment because "their disadvan-
50. Supra note 35 at 14.
51. R. Delgado, "Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to
be a Role Model?" (1991) 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1222 at 1228.
52. Ibid. at 1229.
53. Supra note20at 115.
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tage has taken that opportunity from them. 54 It is doubtful that the
impoverished inner-city black or the native child on a reserve will benefit
much from the fact that a black judge sits on the Supreme Court or a native
professor has been appointed to the law faculty of a nearby university. If
anyone benefits from these role models, it will be blacks or natives who
have the financial resources to attend institutions where the role model is
placed.
Still, while not everyone benefits from a role model, some will. Where
visible minority groups have been discriminated against in the past, it is
important for members to know that there is a possibility of success. In
the black community, for example, politicians such as Colin Powell and
Jesse Jackson, sports figures such as Michael Jordan and Tiger Woods,
movie stars such as Denzel Washington and Morgan Freeman, and jazz
musicians such as Oscar Peterson and Ella Fitzgerald have been signifi-
cant role models for younger generations. They show that there are
different paths to success and that it is possible for blacks to succeed in
this society.
c. Needs of the Community
Some scholars argue that the utility calculation weighs in favour of
preferential policies if one considers the broad needs of a particular
visible minority group. Nagel supports preferential admissions policies
for black medical students. He argues that there is a need for greater
numbers of black doctors because otherwise the needs of the black
community will go unmet. Arguments on behalf of a rejected white
applicant are weak because the need for black doctors is greater than the
need for white doctors. The self-esteem of whites as a group is not
endangered by such a practice, "since the situation arises only because of
their general social dominance, and the aim of the practice is only to
benefit blacks and not to exclude whites."" Hence, the benefits for the
more needy group outweigh the costs to members of the dominant group.
"Needs" in this context means more than the performance of routine
medical procedures. "Needs" refers to a distinct level of understanding
that visible minority doctors can bring to bear on delivering medical
services to members of their own race. For instance, East Indians tend to
suffer from higher rates of premature cardiovascular disease than other
54. S.L. Carter, Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (New York: Basic Books, 1991)
at 80.
55. Supra note 35 at 16. This argument is similar to the holding in Re Athabasca Tribal
Council v.Amoco Canada, [1981] 1 S .C.R. 699,124 D.L.R. (3d) 1 discussed infra. [hereinafter
Amoco Canada cited to D.L.R.].
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racial groups. 6 An East Indian physician may be more sensitive to the
unique risk factor profiles of East Indian patients and target prevention
efforts accordingly.
3. Problems with Predictions
One difficulty with the utility maximization principle is that it makes
predictions about what will be the state of affairs once a particular
preferential policy is implemented. Generally, these predictions are
based on assumptions that make the usefulness of the principle itself
questionable.
a. Diversity
A popular argument in favour of preferential treatment is that it will
increase diversity in education and employment. The value of this
objective harks back to John Stuart Mill's view that society advances if
a variety of opinions occupy the "free market of ideas."" The importance
of diverse opinions within educational institutions was the gist of the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Bakke that "ethnic diversity . . . is . . . one
element in a range of factors a university may properly consider in
attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body."58 The Court decided
by a vote of five to none that the Constitution permits affirmative action
plans that allow race, on a case by case basis, to be taken into account in
order to achieve a more diverse student body. 9 A more ethnically diverse
faculty or student body will also be a more intellectually diverse faculty
or student body, both of which are crucial features in the development of
academic institutions. I Consider, for example, "Eurocentric" accounts
of North America which do not include accounts of lifestyles, experi-
ences and mistreatment of aboriginal peoples and black slaves. Such
histories are not only inaccurate but also deceiving; they paint a "rosy,"
"clean" and biased version of history when such a history did not occur.
Increasing the number of visible minorities on faculties and in student
56. S. Anand, H. Gerstein & S. Yousuf, "Glucose Metabolic Abnormalities in South Asians
in Canada-Study of Heart Assessment and Risk in Ethnic Groups (SHARE); Pilot Study
Results" (1996) 17 Eur. Heart J. (Abstract Supp.) 39.
57. J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1947) ch. 2.
58. Supra note 25 at 314.
59. See R. Dworkin, "What did Bakke Really Decide?" in R. Dworkin,A Matter of Principle
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 305.
60. See R.L. Simon, "Affirmative Action and the University: Faculty Appointments and
Preferential Treatment" in Cahn, supra note 36.
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bodies encourages the exposition of accounts of history and politics that
differ from the traditional, white manner of academic inquiry.6 The goal
is not to compel others to adopt new viewpoints but to disseminate
information and to express alternative viewpoints. In so doing, theoreti-
cal debate is invigorated, truth about the lives of others is expressed and
new objects of inquiry are investigated.
b. Integration into the Mainstream
Proponents of the group welfare model argue that preferential policies
will hasten integration of visible minorities into mainstream life. This
was an important argument in Action Travail des Femmes v. CNR.62
Action Travail alleged that CN's general hiring practices for unskilled
labourers discriminated against women. The Tribunal ordered that CN
hire one woman in every four employees hired until it reached the goal
of 13 percent representation by women in the targeted job positions. The
Supreme Court affirmed this order, holding that affirmative action
programs help to create a "critical mass" of the previously excluded group
in the work place.63
Underlying this decision is the view that a critical mass of women will
encourage, if not compel, integration of women in the workplace.
However, in many instances, the effects of affirmative action can be
divisive. For instance, on many U.S. university campuses, affirmative
action policies have contributed to widespread separatism and racial
tension among students and faculty alike.' At least two colleges, Temple
University and the University of Florida, have White Student Unions
which were established in opposition to perceived racial double standards
in admissions and campus life.65 At Oberlin College in Ohio, the admin-
istration has set up "special interest" dormitories for minority groups, yet
college officials admit that racial hostility persists on campus .66 Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania officials have agreed to fund a separate black
yearbook, even though only 6 percent of students at the university are
61. See D. D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (New
York: Vintage Books, 1992) at 67.
62. Supra note 37. See also B. Vizkelety, "Affirmative Action, Equality and the Courts:
Comparing Action Travail des Femmes v. CN and Apsit and the Manitoba Rice Farmers
Association v. Manitoba Human Rights Commission" (1990) 4 CJ.W.L. 287.
63. Supra note 37 at 1143-44.
64. From "Diversity Project 1989" cited in D. Takagi, The Retreat from Race (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992) at 110.
65. Supra note 61 at 49.
66. Ibid. at 47.
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black and all other students are represented in one yearbook.67 Duke
University established a policy that required departments to establish not
quotas but "incentives" for minority recruitment. The President of the
university approved the policy on the ground that under a more stringent
policy, a department may be pressured to hire unqualified applicants who
may not be motivated to carry out the research required for tenure
appointments. After intense pressure, mainly from minority students and
some faculty, the Academic Council reversed its policy and imposed a
minority hiring policy.68
Practical experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that while
the objective of integration is laudable, the means chosen may be
counterproductive. Rather than creating harmony among races, affirma-
tive action often creates bitterness and resentment. We must question
whether the divisive effects of certain preferential policies are worth
enduring for the mere possibility of integration in the long-term.
c. Elimination of Discriminatory Firms
At the centre of the debate among efficiency theorists is the issue of the
speed with which a non-discriminatory equilibrium will be reached and
the means that should be employed. Donahue contends that preferential
policies will move society towards the non-discriminatory equilibrium
faster than if such policies were not implemented. Nevertheless, there are
indicators in Canada that the market is moving towards the elimination
of discrimination in the absence of preferential programs. In addition,
some firms are voluntarily implementing preferential treatment in favour
of visible minority groups.
Despite the repeal of Ontario's Employment Equity Act69 in 1995, a
number of companies have continued with equity initiatives. A survey of
221 employers by Omnibus Consulting Inc. of Toronto indicated that 54
percent of companies thought repealing the provincial EEA would have
little effect on their equity initiatives while about 24 percent said they
thought implementation of such initiatives would be delayed. Twenty-
three percent of companies said they would stop all work on employment
equity. If the provincial EEA were to be reformed instead of repealed, 69
percent of companies said they thought the change would have little
impact on their equity initiatives, while 24 percent stated that they would
67. Ibid. at 48.
68. Ibid. at 163-66.
69. S.O. 1993, c. 35 rep. by Job Quotas Repeal Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 4 [hereinafter
Provincial EEA].
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delay implementation of their programs. Only eight percent stated that
they would withdraw their initiatives completely.70
Voluntary actions by firms to adopt some sort of affirmative action
support the argument that the market itself may eliminate racial discrimi-
nation. If so, is government intervention necessary?
4. The Moral Basis of Utility Arguments
a. Efficiency Model
In examining justifications for preferential policies, it is crucial to
mention that certain aspects of the utility maximization paradigm lack
moral foundations. The theory is that if society functions more effi-
ciently, everyone is better off; thus, we should maximize efficiency. It is
entirely possible, however, that an efficient society would not make us all
better off. As discussed, employers can engage in racist hiring practices
which are nevertheless efficient. Although profits would be maximized,
what of employees and prospective employees? These individuals de-
serve equal treatment when being considered for employment or promo-
tions, but the efficiency model disregards these interests. The model
tolerates racism as long as, in the final analysis, efficiency will be
maximized. The model is open to criticism because it "takes existing
preferences, of whatever kind, as givens and provides no ethical criteria
for disqualifying morally offensive, self-destructive, or irrational prefer-
ences unworthy of recognition."7 If the utility maximization principle is
to serve to justify preferential policies, the principle must be evaluated on
the basis not only of its predictions about whether the market will
eliminate discrimination but also its willingness to disregard morally
reprehensible preferences because they are immoral.
b. Need: The Bridge between Utility Maximization and Distributive
Justice?
While the efficiency model lacks moral foundation, another strand of the
utility maximization principle does not. The group welfare model aims to
reduce poverty and inequality in a particular group .72 Welfare is defined
70. M. Gibb-Clark, "Employers favour equity reform: Many want Ontario law changed or
left alone rather than repealed as Tories have vowed" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (23 June
1995) B6.
71. Supra note 5 at 21. Trebilcock is speaking here specifically about Pareto efficiency.
72. J. W. Nickel, "Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admissions" in B. Gross, ed.,Reverse
Discrimination (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1977) at 330.
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not in terms of efficiency, but in terms of "need." The question asked is
whether the preferential policy meets specific needs of the minority
group. As noted throughout this section, the various needs to which the
policy responds may include: a need for role models, a need for more
expertise in the community, or a need to create a critical mass of visible
minorities in the workplace.
The focus on needs in the group welfare model raises the question of
whether the moral justification of the utility maximization principle is to
maximize utility or whether it is to effect distributive justice. As the
following discussion will show, the principle of distributive justice views
preferential policies as a means of redistributing income and opportuni-
ties from advantaged to disadvantaged members of society. Groups
targeted by these policies are identified primarily on the basis of whether,
on average, members hold a disproportionate share of lower paying, less
prestigious jobs. In other words, do members of the group need to be
targeted by a redistributive preferential policy?
Hence, the concept of need serves as a bridge between at least one
strand of the utility maximization principle -the group welfare model -
and the principle of distributive justice. 73 However, on a theoretical level,
the differences between the two principles are stark. As we will see in the
following section, under the distributive justice principle, preferential
treatment is based on an assessment of socio-economic need. Under the
utility maximization principle, socio-economic need is not the only
defining feature of utility. Indeed, "utility" may mean a number of things
including diversity, political success, racial harmony and efficiency. In
addition, while cost-benefit analyses are central to utility calculations,
such analyses have relatively little role to play in formulating preferential
policies that seek to redistribute advantages.
5. Summary
By itself, the utility maximization principle is insufficient as a basis for
preferential policies. First, it is difficult to complete a cost-benefit
assessment of a particular policy decision if utilities cannot be defined or
measured. Second, visible minorities will not necessarily be integrated
into the mainstream if preferential policies are implemented. Third, the
efficiency model provides no basis for the moral censure of animus and
thus cannot ground preferential policies. Despite these difficulties, as-
73. See Amoco Canada, supra note 55. See also Roberts v. Ontario (1994), 117 D.L.R. (4th)
297 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Roberts].
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pects of the utility maximization principle-the usefulness of role mod-
els, the importance of diversity and the focus on the needs of a particular
minority group - exemplify some of our deepest intuitions about race and
preference. Like the other two principles that I examine in this article, the
utility maximization principle constitutes one "piece of the puzzle" in
developing a normative justification for preferential treatment.
III. Distributive Justice
Distinct from the idea that preferential policies are justifiable because
they rectify past injustices or maximize social utility is the notion that
these policies promote the redistribution of income and other important
benefits, such as positions in employment and education. Unlike the
rectification principle, which is historical, the distributive justice prin-
ciple focuses on present-day socio-economic issues, particularly the
plight of the chronically poor.
I argue, first, that the idea that the number of visible minorities in
certain professions should be proportionate to their numbers in the
population is problematic; and, second, that preferential policies should
be sensitive to concerns about overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness.
While the distributive justice principle isolates mainly socio-economic
needs, it may appear that no moral justification exists for visible minori-
ties - as opposed to other groups - to benefit under preferential policies.
I argue, however, that it is justifiable to distribute advantages to visible
minorities alone where the visible minority group is severely disadvan-
taged .74
1. Two Models of Distributive Justice
The principle of distributive justice requires that benefits be allocated
based on the needs of the particular individual or group in question. In this
context, two theoretical models warrant discussion: the "disadvantaged
individual model" and the "proportional representation model."
a. The Disadvantaged Individual Model
Liberal theorists think that some individuals- such as visible minorities
and women-fare worse than others in competitive markets because of
74. "Disadvantage" refers to positions or circumstances in which individuals have lower-
income, lower education and training and less prestigious occupations than other individuals
on average.
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characteristics over which they have no control.75 They argue that
characteristics such as race and sex are "morally arbitrary," and that it is
unjust that such individuals suffer as a result. In order to achieve equality
of opportunity, the state must compensate these disadvantaged individu-
als. "Equality of opportunity" does not simply mean that individuals have
the same legal rights of access to advantaged positions and societal
resources.76 As Rawls argues, this conception of the term is "unstable"
because "distributive shares are decided by the outcome of the natural
lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. '77 Rather,
individuals should have the same prospects of success regardless of their
initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the class into
which they are born. 78
How do we ensure that individuals will have the same prospects of
success? Rawls advocates the "difference principle" which governs the
distribution of economic resources. As Rawls explains, inequalities in
economic wealth which result from morally arbitrary characteristics "are
just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the
expectations of the least advantaged members of society. ' ' 9 In other
words, under the difference principle, individuals are entitled to a greater
share of society's resources only if they can demonstrate that the "least
advantaged class" benefits .80 This class includes either individuals whose
income is no greater than the average income of individuals in the lowest
relevant social position, such as unskilled workers, or individuals with
less than half the median income and wealth in the society. 81
What is the position of visible minorities under the disadvantaged
individual model? While proponents of the model do not disagree that
visible minorities should receive benefits, they argue that visible minori-
ties should not benefit simply because they belong to a certain race.
Rather, visible minorities should benefit only if they fall within the least
advantaged class. Compensation depends on income level, not on skin-
colour.
75. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). R. Dworkin,
"What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare; Part II: Equality of Resources" (1981) 10 Phil.
& Pub. Affairs 185,283 and "What is Equality? Part III: The Place of Liberty" (1987) 73 Iowa
L.R. 1.
76. Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part I," ibid. at 207.
77. Rawls, supra note 75 at 74.
78. Ibid. at 73.
79. Ibid. at 75.
80. See R. Martin, Rawls and Rights (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985) ch. 5,
which discusses various interpretations of the difference principle.
81. Rawls, supra note 75 at 98.
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b. The Proportional Representation Model
Whereas the disadvantaged individual model focuses on the income level
of individuals, the proportional representation model is group-oriented.
The model focuses on the low percentages of visible minorities, or sub-
groups of visible minorities, in various sectors of the labour force. It
asserts that these low percentages are evidence of discrimination against
visible minorities and that in a society without discrimination, the
numbers of visible minorities in various professions would be propor-
tionate to their presence in the population at large. Because the number
of visible minorities is disproportionate to their presence in society, it is
necessary to allot employment positions on a group percentage basis
under a quota system or set-aside program. Devising such a policy
necessitates an examination of which groups have been kept out of certain
positions.
The proportional representation model seeks "equality of result,"
whereby each group ends up with an equal share of the particular good
being allocated.12 Ensuring equal outcomes is necessary in order to
increase the level of participation of various groups in the labour force or
the presence of these groups in the student body.
2. Problems with Proportional Representation
The proportional representation model draws heavily on statistical data
concerning the percentages of visible minorities in various professions.
For instance: blacks in the United Stated today constitute only 5 percent
of university faculty, 3 percent of financial managers, 3 percent of
physicians, 2 percent of lawyers and judges, and 1 percent of architects. 3
These percentages are lower than the percentages of visible minority
groups in society as a whole. Proponents of the representation model
argue that visible minorities are underrepresented in various professions
because they have experienced discrimination. Preferential policies,
particularly quotas and set-asides, are justified in order to even out racial
imbalances in the labour force.
82. See Rosenfeld, supra note 11 at 23.
83. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994 (Washington,
D.C.: G.P.O., 1994) at407 cited in D. D'Souza, The EndofRacism: Principlesfora Multiracial
Society (New York: Free Press, 1995) at 443.
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a. Failure to Take into Account Cultural Traits, Choices and
Preferences
The proportional representation model assumes that discrimination is the
source of minority underrepresentation. However, there may be reasons
other than discrimination that cause the underrepresentation of visible
minorities in a certain field. As Devine-Wolf states with respect to
university faculty appointments:
... there is no prima facie reason to suppose that members of different
racial and ethnic minorities would be equally likely to want to go into the
professoriate and, on the contrary, many reasons to expect that they would
not .... [M]embers of one community will value different sorts of
character traits, encourage the acquisition of different skills, and have
different ideas about what sorts of jobs carry the most prestige.'
While some cultures respect medical doctors and engineers, others may
respect artists and musicians. For instance the predominance of South
Asians in medicine as opposed to law cannot be attributed simply to racial
discrimination. The South Asian preference for the sciences is also
evident among the Asian population at large. As Hsia explains, "[t]he
fields of science, mathematics, and engineering, and premedical pro-
grams have increasingly been the top choice of Asian Americans.""
Cultural traits give rise to differences in individual preferences and
choices. Why are there so few blacks in symphony orchestras relative to
the number of whites and Asians? Why are there so few blacks and Asians
in the National Hockey League? Why do a majority of black doctorates
obtain their Ph.D.'s in education, social work and sociology and not in
algebra, German, classics and cell biology?86 It seems reasonable to
conclude that members of different racial groups have different career
preferences for which the proportional representation model does not
account. As D'Souza remarks, "[p]roportional representation fails to
consider differences in talents, culture, interests, and preferences that
partly explain the current dispersion of groups in the work force."87
b. Failure to Consider History
The proportional representation model asserts that if there is a low
number of individuals from one racial group in a certain profession,
84. C. Wolf-Devine, "Proportional Representation of Women and Minorities" in Cahn,
supra note 36, 224.
85. J. Hsia, Asian Americans in Higher Education and at Work (New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, 1988) at 128.
86. D'Souza, supra note 83 at 304.
87. Ibid. at 300.
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preferential policies are justified in order to even out the imbalance.
Carried to its logical conclusion, proportional representation could ne-
cessitate preferential policies for activities where whites are
underrepresented, such as the fields of jazz and rap, and sports such as
football, basketball and track and field.88 This logic is fallacious because
it does not examine history, or the root of the injustice. We can be fairly
certain that whites do not suffer discrimination in professional sports
today. They had their own formal systems of discrimination in sports in
the past which have only recently been dismantled. The proportional
representation model is inadequate as a basis for preferential policies
because it overlooks historical patterns of discrimination and, instead,
concentrates on numbers and percentages. These figures tell us very little
about whether a particular group has actually experienced discrimination
and would, therefore, benefit under preferential policies.
3. Problems with Inclusion
One of the more compelling features of the disadvantaged individual
model is that it advocates redistribution of benefits to the chronically
poor. Some proponents of the model object to preferential policies as
being either "overinclusive," in that they provide preferential treatment
to visible minorities who do not require such treatment, or"underinclusive,"
in that they fail to provide preferential treatment to nonvisible minorities
who require such treatment.89
a. Overinclusiveness
The disadvantaged individual model argues that by focusing on visible
minorities alone, preferential policies are too broad, since they give
benefits to some individuals who do not need them. This argument is
persuasive. Many members of visible minorities have high academic
grades and financial resources that enable them to attend university. In its
1991 census, Statistics Canada reported that 22.8 percent of Japanese and
26.9 percent of Koreans living in Canada had university degrees com-
88. Ibid.at441.
89. This argument is evident throughout Alan Goldman's Justice and Reverse Discrimina-
tion, supra note 7. See also Trakman, supra note 32 and Fiss, supra note 27 at 84. Fiss proposes
a doctrine of constitutional interpretation called the "group-disadvantaging principle" under
which blacks as a group ought to be protected from hostile state action. Fiss recognizes that
the group-disadvantaging principle may be viewed to be overinclusive, but contends that this
criticism should not preclude application of the principle (supra note 27 at 139-40).
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pared with 11.4 percent for the total population. In the week prior to the
1991 census, 6.3 percent of Japanese and 8.1 percent of Koreans in
Canada were unemployed compared with 10.2 percent of the total
population. Finally, 18.7 percent of the Japanese-Canadian work force
population was concentrated in the professional sector compared to 12.9
percent for the total population.90
Japanese- and Korean-Canadians are examples of visible minority
groups who seem to do better than the rest of the Canadian population.
Such groups should not be targeted by preferential policies because,
unlike the chronically poor, they are not disadvantaged.9
b. Underinclusiveness
Advocates of the disadvantaged individual model further criticize pref-
erential policies for excluding individuals who require assistance. In light
of the growing number of poor people in Canada and the United States,
the argument in favour of redistribution to poor people generally is
persuasive. In the United States in 1960, the percentage of central city
households with incomes below the poverty line was 13.7. In 1980, it was
14.0 and in 1987, it was 15.4.92 The probability that a child under the age
of eighteen would be living in a poor family increased from 15 to 20
percent between 1970 and 1986. Between 1970 and 1987, the percentage
of female-headed families increased rapidly among all racial and occu-
pational groups. The percentage among whites increased from 8 to 13
percent and among blacks from 28 to 42 percent.93 As I will discuss in
section IV, unless preferential policies redistribute advantages to poor
people without regard to skin colour, a whole sector of the population that
requires assistance is left uncompensated.
90. Statistics Canada, "A Profile of Japanese in Canada" and "A Profile of Koreans in
Canada" in Fact Sheets on the EmploymentEquity Designated Groups, 1991 (Ottawa: Ministry
of Industry, 1995). With respect to arguments relating to Japanese Canadians, one may assert
that the Canadian government's internment of the Japanese during the Second World War
warrants preferential treatment in favour of this group. However, such an argument would be
based on the rectification principle more than the distributive justice principle.
91. See R. L. Simon, "Affirmative Action and the University" in Cahn, supra note 36, at 63.
92. U.S. Bureau of the Census, supra note 83, cited in Paul E. Peterson, "Urban Underclass
and the Poverty Paradox" in C. Jencks & P.E. Peterson, eds., The Urban Underclass
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1991) 3 at 7.
93. Ibid. at 8.
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c. Why Race as Such Matters
Given the persuasiveness of arguments relating to overinclusion and
underinclusion, is there anything about raceper se thatjustifies designing
preferential policies? Section I argued that if a group were discriminated
against in the past, it was morally justifiable to target that group under a
preferential policy, provided that the group continues to suffer the effects
of past discrimination today. In order to determine whether a visible
minority group meets this condition, we must examine certain phenom-
ena that are significant from the standpoint of distributive justice, such as
the poverty, education and crime levels of particular visible minority
groups in society.
In Canada, aboriginals are extremely disadvantaged. Consider the
Mdtis. In 1991, almost two-thirds (63.2 percent) of the Mdtis population
aged 15 and over had not completed high school, 8.8 percent had attained
a high school diploma and 1.8 percent had a university degree. In the week
prior to the 1991 Census, a higher percentage of the Mdtis population was
unemployed (25.5 percent), compared with the total population (10.2
percent) and the total aboriginal population (19.4 percent) 94
The evidence that certain visible minority groups are severely and
chronically disadvantaged supports the argument that these groups need
the benefits of preferential policies. As will be suggested in section IV,
it is consistent with the distributive justice principle for the state to adopt
a policy under which poor people receive preferential treatment and poor
visible minorities also receive such treatment. As Wolf-Devine states,
[p]rograms targeted at the economically disadvantaged should . . . be
supplemented by special compensatory programs aimed at blacks and
Native Americans .95
Thus, in accordance with principle of distributive justice, it is morally
justifiable to assist visible minorities using preferential policies as long
as those visible minorities fall within the class of economically disadvan-
taged people generally.
4. Summary
It is justifiable to provide preferential treatment to visible minorities in
order to rectify past wrongs from which they currently suffer. However,
in order to assess whether the group currently suffers from a past wrong,
94. Statistics Canada, "A Profile of Persons with Mdtis Origin in Canada" in Fact Sheets on
the Employment Equity Designated Groups, 1991 (Ottawa: Ministry of Industry, 1995) 1.
95. C. Wolf-Devine, "Proportional Representation of Women and Minorities" in Cahn,
supra note 36 at 227.
122 Dalhousie Law Journal
we must examine the group's socio-economic circumstances. Such an
examination raises issues of distributive justice-the level of poverty,
income and education of the particular visible minority group relative to
other groups in society. An examination of these issues leads to the
conclusion that, contrary to the underlying rationale of the disadvantaged
individual model, there are certain visible minority groups whose poverty
is so severe and self-perpetuating that they ought to be targeted by
preferential policies designed specifically for them. In Section IV I
examine the form that such policies may take.
IV. Who Should Pay?
Even if one agrees that preferential policies are morally justified, a
number of questions still arise. Who bears the burden of compensation?
Does society at large owe a duty to compensate or only specific individu-
als? What form should the compensation take? Such questions have
become particularly prominent because of intense criticisms of demand-
side policies, such as affirmative action, from those who view young
white males as suffering unfairly. 96 This section examines three argu-
ments against affirmative action: first, the claim that affirmative action
policies constitute reverse discrimination because they do not treat all
individuals equally; second, that these policies force young white males
to bear a disproportionate burden in rendering compensation to visible
minorities; and third, that these policies overlook the importance of merit
in decisions with respect to hiring and university admissions.
I consider the reverse discrimination argument weak, since it is based
on a notion of equality that ignores substantive differences, such as socio-
economic disadvantages, among individuals. I agree, however, that if we
adopt a conception of liberty based on "equal concern and respect," it is
unfair, first, to place the burden of compensation on the shoulders of a
disproportionate few and second, to prevent individuals from advancing
in employment or education on the basis of merit. Preferential policies
should distribute the burden or compensation among members of the
society as a whole. Consequently, demand-side policies should be
discarded in favour of supply-side policies, such as those outlined at the
end of this section.
96. See H. E. Jones, "On the Justifiability of Reverse Discrimination" in Gross, supra note
72,355.
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1. Reverse Discrimination
a. The Argument
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads:
[eivery individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and,
in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour .... ."
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that,
"no state shall .... deny to a person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws ....,"9 Arguments against reverse discrimination
derive from these provisions. Each individual is equal before the law.
Therefore, it is unconstitutional to accord preferential treatment to
individuals on the basis of their colour since doing so would mean that
other individuals do not receive equal treatment.
The argument with respect to reverse discrimination in the Canadian
context differs from the American since section 15(2) of the Charter
explicitly sanctions affirmative action programs. Section 15(2) states,
[s]ubsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as
its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race .... 99
However, the decision in Apsit v. Manitoba Human Rights Commis-
sion1°° undermines section 15(2). Apsit involved a challenge by non-
native wild rice farmers to a policy giving preference to certain aboriginals
in the issuing of wild rice licenses. Despite section 15(2), the trial court
struck down the program as discriminatory against non-natives. Accord-
ing to Simonsen J., "a special law or program which is put forward under
s. 15(2) cannot be justified if it unnecessarily denies the existing rights of
the non-target group. 1 °1
97. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982 c.l 1 [hereinafter the Charter]. For a
discussion of meaning of "equality" in s. 15(1) see Andrews v. Law Society (B.C.), [1989] 1
S.C.R. 143. See also the pre-Charter case Bloedel v. University of Calgary (1980), 1 C.H.R.R.
D/25 [hereinafter Bloedel], in which a non-native woman challenged a program aimed at
redressing the social disadvantages experienced by First Nations Peoples. The Alberta Board
of Inquiry held that the program violated the anti-discrimination provisions of Alberta's human
rights legislation. See also Amoco Canada, supra note 55.
98. U.S. Cons. amend. XIV§ I [hereinafter the Fourteenth Amendment].
99. Section 15(2), Charter, Supra note 97.
100. (1988),9 C.H.R.R. D/4457 (Man. Q.B.), rev'd on other grounds (1989), 10 C.H.R.R. D/
5633 (C.A.) [hereinafter Apsit].
101. Ibid.
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The reverse discrimination argument is founded on what is referred to
in Canadian jurisprudence as "formal equality .'t02 According to this
conception, "all individuals are to be treated alike regardless of histories
of exclusion, denials of resources and opportunities."103 Formal equality
calls for like treatment regardless of race, sex, disability. It holds that from
the standpoint of admissions policies and hiring decisions, these charac-
teristics should be irrelevant. As Bickel states, "a quota is a divider of
society, a creator of castes, and it is all the worse for its racial base,
especially in a society desperately striving for an equality that will make
race irrelevant."'104
b. Difficulties with Formal Equality
Historical Disadvantage
The conception of formal equality, and the reverse discrimination argu-
ment to which it gives rise, ignores the fact that, in the United States and
Canada, the right to equal treatment was violated for years by racist
exclusions. As I discussed in section I, various visible minority groups -
such as blacks and aboriginals - were historically subjected to discrimi-
natory laws, policies and systemic practices. White males argue, how-
ever, that they are not responsible today for the sins that their forebears
may have committed. Rather, as citizens in present-day society, they have
the right to expect that equal protection laws will apply to them just as they
will apply to everyone else, regardless of colour. White males do not deny
that past discrimination occurred. Rather, they contend that they have an
inalienable right to equal protection, where "equal" in fact means "like".
Some critical race scholars answer that because whites historically
violated the rights of visible minorities, it is legitimate to impose similar
sacrifices on whites themselves. As Delgado states,
for more than 200 years, white males benefited from their own program of
affirmative action, through unjustified preferences in jobs and education
resulting from old-boy networks and official laws that lessened the
competition. Today's affirmative action critics never characterize that
scheme as affirmative action, which of course it was. 0,
102. See Action Travail, supra note 37 and Roberts, supra note 73, Weiler J.A.
103. C. Sheppard, Study Paper on Litigating the Relationship between Equity and Equality,
(Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1993) at 4. See also Vizkelety, supra note 62.
104. A. M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975)
at133.
105. Delgado, supra note 51. In this article, Delgado actually argues against affirmative
action.
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This statement raises two separate issues. First, whether affirmative
action for white males existed and second, if it did exist, whether white
males should be compelled to render compensation today.
It seems likely that some form of preferential treatment in favour of
white males did, indeed, exist under which both visible minorities and
women were excluded from positions in the labour force. However, I
argue that imposing the burden of compensation for historical injustices
on white males today is unjust because it forces one class of individuals
to make reparations when an entirely different class of individuals
perpetrated the injustice. The responsibility of compensation should be
spread more evenly throughout society.
Current Disadvantage
Formal equality also fails to recognize the persistent patterns of disadvan-
tage among certain groups in society .106 The argument in section III was
that certain groups are, on a socio-economic level, more chronically
disadvantaged than others. Academic debates with respect to chronic
disadvantage focus on causes of disadvantage.10 7 Regardless, few would
agree that these problems can be eradicated by resorting to the conception
of formal equality. Indeed, it seems to be commonplace that the vast
socio-economic differences between racial groups renders "equality
before the law" an academic turn of phrase which carries little practical
significance in terms of alleviating racial disadvantage.
c. Substantive Equality
Past injustices and current disadvantages render preferential policies
morally justifiable. Formal equality, however, is insufficient. Thus our
conception of equality must be reformulated to support preferential
policies.
Unlike formal equality, the ideal of substantive equality examines "the
social and economic patterns which affect disadvantaged groups, such as
high levels of unemployment, low educational backgrounds, and perva-
sive poverty .... ,,108 Substantive equality aims to reduce existing
disadvantages and to allow individuals to compete on a level playing
106. Vizkelety, supra note 62.
107. See, e.g., supra note 21; see also C. Jencks, Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty and
the Underclass (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), ch. 4.
108. Vizkelety,supra note 62 at 291.
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field. 09 In order to achieve this goal, we must look at the actual social and
economic conditions of the individuals or groups in question.
One may argue that support for this conception of equality necessitates
support for affirmative action programs, since these policies acknowl-
edge and seek to remedy the disadvantaged position of various groups in
society." 10 On the contrary, endorsing the notion of substantive equality
at this stage simply implies that the reverse discrimination argument, and
the conception of equality on which it is based, are not decisive, since they
fail to account for historical and current disadvantages faced by visible
minority groups.
2. Disproportionate Burden
a. The Argument
One may also consider affirmative action policies unfair because they
compel a small portion of the population-typically comprising young
white males- to bear the burden of compensation to visible minorities."'
Even though affirmative action policies may be justified under the
conception of substantive equality, this disproportionate burden weighs
against the adoption of these policies.
b. Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries
Some white males argue that the burden placed on them to compensate
visible minorities is unfair since not every white benefited from slavery
and discrimination.' 12 Consider recent white immigrants. If I am a white
male and I recently immigrated from Norway, why should I have to
participate in the system of compensation? Neither I nor my ancestors had
anything to do with the despicable system of slavery. In addition, what of
whites who actually opposed slavery? Why should their descendants owe
a duty? The burden placed upon white males is disproportionate because
it makes an entire class pay for the injustices committed by persons to
whom members of the class may bear no direct relation.
109. See A.F. Bayefsky, Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Agincourt: Carswell, 1985) at 21.
110. An example of such an affirmation program is contained in Canada's Employment
Equity Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 23 as rep. by Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44.
The Act focuses on visible minorities, the disabled, aboriginal peoples and women.
111. H. Jones,"On the Justifiability of Reverse Discrimination" in Gross, supra note 72,355.
112. T. Nagel, "Introduction" in Nagel, Cohen & Scanlon, supra note 27, x.
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One response to this argument is that it is necessary to draw a
distinction between direct and indirect beneficiaries. Although the Nor-
wegian immigrant or the descendant of those opposed to slavery may not
have directly benefited from unjust historical practices, they are never-
theless indirect beneficiaries. White males, by virtue of their colour and
gender, benefit from a social atmosphere in which that is the best thing to
be. 3 In the absence of affirmative action, white males (including the
Norwegian immigrant) will continue to benefit from the effects of the
original discrimination. 14 Hence, the burden imposed upon them is not
disproportionate to the benefits that they derive from the original injus-
tice.
While white males may benefit more than others from the sins of their
ancestors, is it fair to weigh the effects of past injustices in this manner?
Many visible minorities may not require the benefits of affirmative
action. Further, many white males may come from poor socio-economic
backgrounds. If either of these cases persist, colour seems to be an
arbitrary characteristic on which to base preferential policies. Therefore,
regardless of such historical injustices as those perpetrated by slave
owners and white entrepreneurs under the Jim Crow system, white males
alone ought not to be forced to bear the burden of reparation to the
exclusion of other groups in the society.
c. Liberty and Self-respect
At the core of the disadvantaged individual model is the belief, held by
egalitarian liberals, that each individual is entitled to "equal concern and
respect.""' 5 This phrase means that everyone has the liberty, first, to
pursue his or her own conception of the good; and second, to revise that
conception if necessary. Yet, as the disadvantaged individual model
acknowledges, not all individuals have the same natural abilities or social
status to participate in the economic system from "an equal starting
point." Hence, egalitarian liberals advocate an economic system which
seeks to maximize the scope for individual choice while compensating
individuals who suffer from disadvantages over which they have no
control. Dworkin describes this objective as one which is "ambition-
sensitive" but "endowment-insensitive." '" 6 That is, it accepts as legiti-
113. Ibid.
114. G. Sher, "Reverse Discrimination in Employment" in Nagel, Cohen & Scanlon, supra
note 27, 54.
115. Dworkin, supra note 76.
116. Ibid.
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mate inequalities that derive from differences in ambition and effort since
these are differences for which a person may be held morally responsible.
Yet, at the same time, it corrects for differences that are morally arbitrary,
such as race and gender which give rise to inequalities. In order to
compensate individuals for being penalized as a result of undeserved
inequalities, egalitarian liberals argue that "background institutions"" 7
that ensure the transfer and distribution of wealth are necessary.
In considering preferential policies, the conception of an ambition-
sensitive, endowment-insensitive distribution matters. Affirmative ac-
tion attempts to place visible minorities in positions where others will be
insensitive to their race (i.e., they will not take race into account) but
where visible minorities can still pursue their individual ambitions.
However, affirmative action programs are not ambition-sensitive vis-A-
vis white males since they may prevent white males from obtaining jobs
which they would otherwise earn on merit. Under these policies, there-
fore, it appears that the life aspirations of the white male do not matter
equally.
Why, one may ask, does it matter if the white male's life plans do not
matter equally- his needs are often not nearly as great as those of poor
visible minorities. The aspirations of the white male matter equally for the
same reason that it matters whether a black woman's aspirations matter
equally: unless each individual is able to lead his or her life from the
inside-to develop and pursue his or her own conception of the good-
he or she may lose, or never attain, self-respect. Without self-respect,
one's life has little meaning." 8
d. Supply-side Policies
It may appear that the importance of compensating visible minorities for
having to endure past injustices has been disregarded. On the contrary, the
117. For example, the background institutions that Rawls proposes include: a just constitu-
tion; fair equality of opportunity; equality of opportunity in economic activities and in the free
choice of occupation; and, a "social minimum" or minimum standard of living. Supra note 76
at 271.
118. Jones, supra note 111 at 355. 1 do not mean to suggest that preferential policies are
necessary in order for one to pursue one's own conception of the good. Indeed, neither RawIs
nor Dworkin argues that preferential policies are necessary for one to realize one's own life
plan. Liberalism seeks to refrain from privileging one conception of the good over another. I
am referring to the notion of "conception of the good" in terms of removing barriers in order
to achieve political equality. However, these differing understandings of "conception of the
good" dovetail. One's ability to pursue one's own conception of the good relies on the
expectation that one will be treated equally with other individuals in applying for positions in
employment and education.
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argument above relates to demand-side policies only.1 9 It is only under
policies such as affirmative action that the white male stands to bear a
disproportionate share of the burden of compensation. Unlike demand-
side policies, supply-side policies tend to distribute the burden of com-
pensation more widely. As Trebilcock states, "supply-side policies are
attractive because the costs of these programmes would be largely
underwritten by better-endowed members of the community and in turn
would be designed to benefit a wide cross-section of members of
disadvantaged groups.' 20 For instance, the Canadian government pro-
vides welfare services to the aboriginal community. These services
include programs for Indian children and adults and are intended first, to
protect Indians against domestic violence and abuse and second, to
enable adults with physical or mental disabilities to maintain their
independence. Funding for this program is provided by the federal
government; thus the cost of compensation is spread evenly among
taxpayers. No particular group in the society is forced to render more
compensation than any other.
3. Merit
a. The Argument
A third objection to affirmative action policies is that they prevent
individuals from obtaining positions on the basis of merit.12' "Merit" is
evidenced primarily by credentials that are visible on paper-such as
university grades, previous work experience and test scores. Proponents
of merit consider departures from the principle unjust because the
departures lead to a decrease in overall social welfare and undermine
one's legitimate expectations with respect to the criteria for achievement.
Still, there are aspects of the merit principle, particularly its view of what
constitutes an individual's qualifications for the job, that require
reformulation.
119. The terms "supply-side" and "demand-side" are defined in the Introduction, supra. An
extensive discussion of specific supply-side policies appears infra in this section.
120. Supra note 5 at 208.
121. See A.W. MacKay & P. Rubin, Study Paper on Psychological Testing and Human
Rights in Education and Employment (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1996) and
A.H. Goldman, "Justice and Hiring by Competence" (1977) 14 Amer. Phil. Q. 17.
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b. Why Merit Matters
The Welfare Argument
Some individuals assert that unless traditional standards of hiring are
retained, social welfare will decrease. In the context of this argument,
weak-form affirmative action, where a visible minority who is equally
qualified obtains the position, is usually considered less objectionable
than strong-form affirmative action, in which a lesser qualified visible
minority obtains a position at the expense of a more qualified candidate.
Strong-form affirmative action appears especially undesirable be-
cause of the benefits derived from having the most qualified individuals
in all key positions. 2 2 If the merit principle is discarded, the public will
have less confidence in service providers and might hesitate to use their
services. Alternatively, citizens may have no choice but to use the
services of the less competent and will run the risk of harm. Thus,
employers argue that retaining the merit principle not only ensures utility
maximization across society but also a Pareto improvement since there
will be gains to all members of society in overall goods, services and
quality of life.123
One response to this argument is that it perpetuates the disadvantage
of visible minorities. The consequence of having the most qualified
candidate in key positions may be that visible minorities are kept out of
these positions since they tend to be the lesser qualified applicants.
Visible minorities are relegated to lower paying "bluecollar" jobs and, as
a result, they have less disposable income to improve their standard of
living. Thus, "social" welfare does not increase for everybody, it in-
creases only for those in the higher paying positions. This is the case even
if hiring the most competent individuals results in a higher total aggregate
of goods and services produced.
2 4
In order to evaluate these arguments, it is useful to distinguish
between supply-side and demand-side policies. It seems important to
ensure that those responsible for providing goods and services in society
are the best qualified. Yet, if the effect of this policy choice is to exclude
a whole sector of society from obtaining these positions, then it is
necessary to propose additional policies.
122. Goldman, ibid. at 20.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid. at 23.
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Supply-side Policies
Some supply-side policies, particularly early education programs, de-
velop an individual's cognitive and analytical skills. The long-term effect
of these programs is that participants are more likely to be considered
"meritorious." Prime examples of such policies are education and job
training programs. For instance, Project Head Start is a preschool
Program which serves children and families who have incomes below the
poverty line." 5 A 1969 evaluation of the impact of Head Start concluded
that Head Start children "were not appreciably different from their non-
Head Start peers in most aspects of cognitive and affective develop-
ment. 1 26 However, studies since 1969 demonstrate that Head Start has
produced measurable results. In 1982, the first Head Start group was of
high school age. A comparison with a control group of non-Head Start
youngsters with comparable backgrounds shows significant differences:
Headstart graduates who are now high school sophomores score one grade
level higher in reading and mathematics. Only 19 percent of the Headstart
group are in classes for slow learners, compared with 39 percent in the non-
Headstart group. The $6,000 per child invested in Headstart ... may be
saving $15,000 per child in subsequent remedial services.'27
In addition, in the mid- 1980's, the Head Start Synthesis Project reviewed
all published and unpublished research with respect to Head Start. The
Project concluded that: Head Start has immediate positive effects on
children's cognitive ability; Head Start appears to affect the long-term
school achievement of participants in terms of being held back a grade or
being assigned to special education classes; Head Start generates imme-
diate gains in the areas of selfesteem, motivation and social behaviour;
and Head Start improves child health, motor development, nutrition and
dental care.
Programs such as Head Start benefit both the participants and society
as a whole; a larger portion of the population becomes better educated
and, over the long-term, standards of living increase. Demand-side poli-
cies, on the other hand, especially strong-form affirmative action plans,
do not focus on improving the qualifications of the targets of the program.
Rather, they seek equality of result, which overlooks an individual's
125. V. Washington & UJ.O. Bailey, Project Head Start: Models and Strategies for the
Twenty-First Century (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995) at 36.
126. Ibid. at 126. Washington and Bailey refer specifically to the 1969 Report prepared by
the Westinghouse Learning Corporation.
127. F.M. Hechinger, "About Education; Schools' Improvement Goes Unrewarded" The
New York Times (28 December 1982) CI.
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legitimate expectation that he or she will be considered for positions in
employment and university on the basis of merit.
The Meritocracy Argument
The meritocracy argument holds that all positions should be obtained on
the basis of competence. The argument derives from the libertarian
position that "freedoms, including those of disbursing property and
associating with those of one's choice, may only be limited to prevent
harm. '' 28 As the "just holdings model" discussed in section I asserts,
individuals should be free to enter into any contracts they wish on any
terms that they wish. Therefore, if an employer considers a white male to
be the most qualified applicant for a position, the employer ought to be
able to hire that individual. The implication of the meritocracy argument
is that one ends up where one deserves to be.
This view of liberty is unpalatable for at least three reasons. First, traits
such as intelligence are arbitrarily acquired and it is thus unfair to allow
individuals to benefit from such characteristics without offering some
compensation to individuals who are not as well-endowed. Secondly,
freedom is meaningless unless one has the necessities, such as literacy,
clothing, food and shelter, within which this freedom can be exercised.
Thirdly, the ideal of substantive equality requires that persons have a
minimum level of subsistence so they can compete for scarce resources
on a more equal footing.
It may appear that my argument against libertarianism and in favour of
the redistribution of advantages means that I advocate strong-form
affirmative action and that I must also oppose hiring on the basis of merit.
I do not, however, for the following reasons.
Society and other institutions have established certain qualifications
for employment. Individuals in the community rely on these rules. If the
criteria for success suddenly change, then legitimate expectations are
undermined. The effects of such changes may be psychologically devas-
tating.
Since the early 1970's many universities in the United States, and later
Canada, have had to deal with affirmative action in faculty hirings.129 For
128. Goldman,supra note 122 at 20.
129. See T. Sowell, "'Affirmative Action' Reconsidered" in Gross, supra note 72, 113.
Though no particular law in Canada has forced universities to adopt an affirmative action
program, faculties in Canadian universities have addressed these issues on a less formal level.
See, for example, Bloedel, supra note 97.
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example, consider a white male who works for years to complete a Ph.D.
but is refused the one position in his area of specialization, not because
he has not published enough or because his academic record is weak, but
because his skin is not a certain colour. His self-worth and dignity are
jeopardized and his life-plan is undermined. Is it fair to deny him this
position?
One may argue that there are no guarantees that the rules of the game
will not change. Sometimes, in order to ensure that long-term redistribu-
tive goals are met, unfair practices in the shortterm must be tolerated. As
Sandalow explains, "it may be, as some have suggested, that, 'we can
have a colour-blind society in the long run only if we refuse to be colour-
blind in the short run."'"3" Some theorists therefore argue that affirmative
action policies should be "sunsetted" or time limited, so that policy
makers can "avoid stretching the fragile social consensus supporting such
programs beyond the breaking point."''
It may be useful to note, first, that this white male may have encoun-
tered as many obstacles in working to achieve his qualifications as any
visible minority, though admittedly they were likely not related to his
race. Second, one's expectations about the conditions for success in life
are much more fundamental than expectations about the price of goods
or the weather on a particular day. Like all individuals, this white male has
only one life to live. To deny a career to him in particular seems grossly
unfair, especially if he is to be accorded equal concern and respect.
Indeed, the white male may argue that compensation to visible minorities
is a worthy objective but he may believe, nevertheless, that he ought not
to be compelled to make so large a personal sacrifice. Third, the
"legitimate expectations" argument is tied tightly to the notion of self-
respect, which is derived largely from one's sense of having accom-
plished particular goals through effort, and not by chance, luck or hand-
outs.' 32 This seems true for all individuals-for visible minorities and
white males alike. 133
The response to these arguments is also compelling. Just like the white
male, visible minorities have only one life to live. It seems unfair to
support an economic and social system in which many fail to achieve their
life objectives for reasons beyond their control, such as their skin colour.
Certainly, one's self-respect is undermined if one is not judged for
130. T. Sandalow, "Racial Preferences in Higher Education" in Gross, ibid., 259.
131. Supra note 5 at 211.
132. Supra note 7 at 26.
133. Carter, supra note 54 at 62.
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positions in employment and education on the same criteria as everybody
else. In addition, it is necessary also to consider the self-respect of poor
visible minorities who may not have the opportunities to be educated at
America's top universities.
Supply-side Policies
In response to this debate, it is useful again to draw the distinction
between supply- and demand-side policies. Demand-side policies do not
support the libertarian vision of freedom in which employers enter into
contracts on the terms that they wish, and they reduce the importance of
merit in hiring and admissions decisions. Supply-side policies are pref-
erable because they are sensitive to the socio-economic needs of both
visible minorities and employers. One benefit of supply-side policies is
that many of the problems that give rise to disadvantages later in life, such
as a lack of education, are effectively attacked at an early stage. A prime
example is the Head Start Program discussed above. In contrast, demand-
side policies appear more reactive than preventative in that they attack the
problem of disadvantage at the "back-end" after members of disadvan-
taged groups have lived through their formative years in circumstances
of deprivation. Attempting to redress the consequences at later stages in
life is almost certain to be less effective than attacking the problem closer
to its source.'34
c. Why the Merit Standard Needs to be Reformed
The concept of "merit" is not immune from criticism. Commonly adopted
conceptions of merit tend to incorporate professional biases which are
based on white male standards of trainability and competence.3 5 For
instance, many fire departments and police forces have been under
pressure to hire more visible minorities on their respective forces.
13 6
Visible minorities (particularly those from Asia) and women, who tend
on average to be shorter than white males, are often rejected on the
grounds that they do not have the physical capacities to perform the job
in question.
134. Supra note 5 at 212.
135. I. Thalberg, "Reverse Discrimination and the Future" in C.C. Gould & M.W. Wartofsky,
eds., Women and Philosophy (New York: Capricorn Books, 1976) 305.
136. One rationale for these initiatives is that public servants should reflect the racial
composition of the community they serve. See B. Hargrove, "Confronting the Backlash: The
Merits of Employment Equity" (1993) 12(2) Our Times 19.
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Traditional conceptions of merit may also fail to acknowledge that
one's race (and/or sex) may be a qualification in itself. Physical charac-
teristics, such as a particular minimum height, often are not indispensable
to the tasks that police officers and fire-fighters perform. 13 First, there are
criteria of physical strength other than height, such as an ability to lift
heavy objects. Secondly, qualities other than physical strength, such as
the ability to relate to drug offenders or juvenile delinquents, to speak the
language of the community being served, to conciliate domestic disputes
and to relate to other minorities may actually enhance job performance.
Our ideas of "merit" for a particular job ought to be expanded to include
all of the various tasks that the job entails. Perhaps then individuals other
than white males would be considered appropriately qualified.
The particular perspective that a visible minority brings to the job may
also make him or her better qualified.'38 Visible minorities can offer
alternative viewpoints on a wide variety of subjects including history,
politics, philosophy and literature. As Matsuda states, "[t]he outsiders'
different knowledge of discrimination ... is concrete and personal." 139 In
other words, because the "outsider" has actually experienced racial
discrimination, he or she will have an insight into this issue that the white
male lacks. When considering who is meritorious, one ought to consider
the purpose that the individual in the position is intended to serve and to
recognize the value in having an alternative "voice." This does not mean
that we must abandon the merit principle altogether, only that we should
expand our understanding of what merit means.
4. Supply-side Policies
The discussion above highlights the advantages of supply-side policies
over demand-side policies. Outlined below are some supply-side policies
that would be useful in addressing issues of disadvantage among the poor
generally and poor visible minorities in particular. The discussion fo-
cuses on education and community-based programs. The first entails
supply-side policies that have no racial component- they target the poor
generally. The second may be tailored to visible minority communities
specifically.
137. Supra note 5 at 205.
138. M. Matsuda, "Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Ploughed
Up Ground" (1988) 11 Harv. Women's L. J. 1 at 8-9.
139. Ibid.
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The approach favoured here is one in which supply-side policies
should, first, target the poor generally and second, target poor visible
minorities specifically. This approach takes into account that certain
visible minorities-such as inner-city blacks and aboriginals-are ex-
tremely impoverished. 40 Admittedly, it will often be the case that poor
visible minorities will be the primary beneficiaries of supply-side poli-
cies directed at the poor generally, as is the case with Head Start. 4'
However, the option of targeting certain extremely impoverished visible
minority groups remains important since policies directed at the poor
generally may not be sufficient to address the specific needs of a visible
minority group. This approach is appealing because it addresses concerns
with respect to underinclusiveness; the general policy approach is to
favour the chronically poor as a group. The approach also addresses
concerns that preferential policies are overinclusive since the wealthy
(whether they are visible minorities or not) are not permitted to benefit.
a. Education
An underlying theme of the insightful book Within Our Reach: Breaking
the Cycle of Disadvantage is that pre-school programs "have succeeded
in directly reducing or ameliorating the effects of risk factors such as early
school difficulties, failure to acquire basic skills (reading, writing,
arithmetic), low self-esteem, alimentation, a weak sense of efficacy, and
chronic truancy."142 Good pre-school programs positively affect parents'
lives and expectations and children's dispositions to learn. These effects
can actually start an upward spiral of motivation. 43 While some scholars
question the usefulness of pre-school programs,' the approach here
adheres to "the common wisdom that improvements in educational
achievement and in the amounts of schooling will help poor children ."4
140. Throughout this section, I refer to both inner-city blacks and aboriginal peoples as
visible minority groups that are particularly disadvantaged. In identifying these groups, I do
not mean to exclude other disadvantaged visible minorities, such as blacks living in rural
regions in the U.S. (e.g. Mississippi) from qualifying as "disadvantaged."
141. In 1992, the racial composition of Head Start children was as follows: blacks
(37percent), whites (33 percent), Hispanics (23 percent), American Indians (4 percent) and
Asians (3 percent). See supra note 125 at 37.
142. L.B. Schorr & D. Schorr, Within Our Reach: Breaking the Cycle of Disadvantage
(United States: Anchor Press, 1988) at 183.
143. Ibid.
144. These are noted in N. Glazer, "Education and Training Programs and Poverty" in S.H.
Danziger & D.H. Weinberg, eds., Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) at 152.
145. Glazer, ibid. at 154.
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A first set of supply-side policies should concentrate on public educa-
tion programs for disadvantaged individuals.'46 As discussed above,
Project Head Start is an excellent example of an education policy that
addresses the educational needs of poor children. However, educational
programs should not be limited to children. Job-training programs for
new entrants into the work force who perhaps could not afford the costs
of university or college admission are crucial in building an all-inclusive
labour force. One successful example of such a program in the U.S. and
Canada is English as a Second Language (ESL) which is offered to
immigrants and citizens whose integration into competitive markets
would be immeasurably facilitated were they able to speak English.n7 In
the U.S., ESL programs are often established in conjunction with "bilin-
gual education" programs which serve students whose native language is
not English. These programs have proven to be extremely effective
because students are given continued education in content areas along
with structured instruction in English)48
b. Community-based Programs
A second type of strategy for attacking disadvantage falls under the more
general category of "community-based programs" which vary depending
on the specific community being targeted. For instance, the needs of
aboriginal communities (which include on- and off-reserve Indians and
the Inuit) may differ from the needs of the poor population living in
metropolitan centres. Programs such as ESL may not be useful for
individuals who live outside of the cities and who have no intention of
leaving their community to integrate into society at large. In addition,
some individuals within these communities may wish to enter the work
force but may not be equipped with the necessary skills. Thus the
programs must be tailored to specific needs of the particular commu-
nity 4 9 which may be composed exclusively of poor visible minorities.
146. See R.F. Devlin & A.W. MacKay, "An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The
Indigenous Blacks and Micmac Programme at Dalhousie Law School" (1991) 14 Dal. L.J. 296.
147. See S. Nieto, Affirming Diversity: The Sociopolitical Context of Multicultural Educa-
tion (New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1992) at 156, 16061. See also R. F. Devlin,
"Towards Another Legal Education: Some Critical and Tentative Proposals to Confront the
Racism of Modem Legal Education" (1989) 38 U.N.B.LJ. 89.
148. Ibid. at 161.
149. Of course, the formulation of policy may occur following consultation with represen-
tatives of the community and may take place in conjunction with these representatives.
Community-based groups may in fact make these decisions themselves and lobby the state for
funding.
138 Dalhousie Law Journal
For example, the number of children on First Nations reserves in
Ontario is growing rapidly and there is a need for schools. Hence, in 1995,
the Canadian government through the Department of Indian and North-
ern Development has provided funding and in the fall of 1995, five First
Nations all opened new facilities."' In addition, to address the pressing
issue of domestic violence on First Nations' reserves, the Canada Mort-
gage and Housing Corporation developed a women's shelter at Big Trout
Lake in the Province of Ontario where victims of domestic violence
receive emergency shelter, interim housing, counselling and support in
dealing with problems of family abuse and violence. 5 '
Visible minority communities within metropolitan centres may also
require assistance under supplyside policies specifically targeted to them.
For instance, certain Canadian cities have established "Program without
Walls" which provides inhome support to parents, educational programs
for parents and children and community food and nutrition programs. In
North York, Program without Walls operates under the aegis of nine
agencies, one of which is the Somali Immigrant Aid Organization
(SIAO). SIAO holds workshops and seminars to educate the community
about nutrition, gardens and inexpensive ways of purchasing food.
Ostensibly, SIAO offers its services to the community at large. In
practice, however, it serves the Somali community almost exclusively.
5. Summary
As a demand-side policy, affirmative action is unfair. It compels white
males to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of compensating
visible minorities and overlooks the importance of merit as a criterion for
hiring and admissions. Supply-side policies are preferable, first because
they spread the costs of compensation more widely and second, because
they seek to intercept cycles of deprivation at an early stage in order to
address problems that in the long-term exacerbate disadvantage. By
discarding affirmative action and by retaining supply-side policies we
can accommodate two conceptions of liberty - the libertarian's view that
150. Department of Indian and Northern Development, Pride in Partnership (Ottawa: The
Department, 1996). The First Nations which benefited under this policy included Grassy
Narrows, Sandy Lake, Six Nations of the Grand River, Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point
and Weenusk First Nations.
151. Ibid. The shelter, called the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Equaygamik Women's Shelter, was
developed under Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation's (CMHC) "Project Haven/Next
Step Program."
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employers should be able to hire individuals based on criteria of their
choosing (within the confines of anti-discrimination legislation) and the
egalitarian's belief that liberty is dependent on a minimum level of social
and economic well-being.
Conclusion
In both Canada and the United States, preferential policies are under
attack. Although employment equity legislation exists at the federal level
in Canada, similar legislation has recently been repealed at the provincial
level in Ontario. In the U.S., affirmative action was a central issue in the
last presidential election. President Clinton endorsed weak-form affirma-
tive action in which qualified visible minorities are accorded preferential
treatment if they meet employer standards with respect to qualifications.
Nevertheless, he initiated a review of all affirmative action programs at
the federal level and, "is expected to conclude that at least some of them
must go. '152 Without question, the future of preferential policies is in
jeopardy. Will they be abolished? If not, what form will they take?
In the context of these political debates, this article offers a different
approach to the formulation of preferential policies and provides norma-
tive justifications for them. Preferential policies are justifiable in order to
rectify past injustices committed against a visible minority group. How-
ever the criterion for awarding compensation is not merely the character-
istic of race per se: if the group no longer experiences present effects of
past discrimination, no compensation under the rectification principle is
owed.
A useful indicator as to whether the group currently suffers the effects
of past discrimination is the group's socio-economic status. Referring to
socio-economic factors triggers concerns related to the principle of
distributive justice, which focuses on the socio-economic position of one
group relative to other groups in society. Thus, justifying preferential
policies under the rectification principle involves application of the
distributive justice principle. Together, these principles warrant the
provision of preferential treatment to poor visible minorities and screens
out visible minorities who, from a financial perspective, do not require
benefits granted under preferential policies.
152. J. B irnbaum, "The government's affirmative-action programs are under scrutiny and not
likely to survive intact" (1996) Politics 1.
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Although preferential policies in favour of visible minorities are
justifiable in specific circumstances, certain types of preferential poli-
cies-particularly demand-side policies such as affirmative action-
have triggered disapproval from certain sectors of the population. Critics
argue that under affirmative action programs, young white males bear a
disproportionate burden of compensation since, in large measure, it is
they who are denied positions in employment and education in favour of
visible minorities. This argument becomes more forceful if we adopt a
conception of liberty based on the notion of "equal concern and respect."
Under affirmative action plans, the life plans of a white male seem to
matter less than those of visible minorities since his merit is often
overlooked and his legitimate expectations of being hired are under-
mined.
These criticisms compel us to balance the interests of visible minori-
ties in receiving preferential treatment with the interests of those who
object to having to bear the costs of this compensation. Preferential
treatment in favour of visible minorities should take the form of supply-
side policies. Supply-side policies, such as early education programs, not
only spread the costs of preferential policies more equitably but also
enable the merit principle to govern decisions with respect to hiring and
admissions. At the same time, supply-side policies address issues of
socio-economic disadvantage that are largely responsible for precluding
visible minorities from acceding to positions of wealth, power and
prestige in society. In this way, supply-side policies underpin a notion of
equality - substantive equality- according to which all individuals must
attain a certain minimum standard of living. Substantive equality is
possible only if there is a redistribution of advantages in society not only
to visible minorities but also to the class of poor people generally.
With the survival of preferential policies in jeopardy, it is crucial for
individuals on all sides of the political spectrum to recognize the sound
normative justifications for these policies as well as the alternative
approach to policy formulation. It is only with this recognition that we
will be able to attain our ideals without entrenching animosity between
advantaged and disadvantaged groups. The success of preferential poli-
cies in Canada and the United States depends upon their ability to account
for a plurality of factors such as the need to rectify past injustices, to
account for marked differences in socio-economic status and to enable
each individual to attain an acceptable level of self-worth. While our
experiences with preferential policies have demonstrated that the devel-
opment of these policies will be difficult, it is both possible and vital.
